




















Suppose that an economic agent is (1 − ε)×100% certain that uncertainty she faces is
characterized by a particular probability measure, but that she has a fear that, with ε×100%
chance, her conviction is completely wrong and she is left perfectly ignorant about the true
measure in the present as well as in the future. This situation is often called “ε-contamination
of conﬁdence.” The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple set of behavioral axioms
under which the decision-maker’s preference is represented by the Choquet expected utility
with the ε-contamination of conﬁdence.
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1. Introduction
Suppose that an economic agent is (1 − ε) × 100% certain that uncertainty she faces is
characterized by a particular probability measure, but that she has a fear that, with ε × 100%
chance, her conviction is completely wrong and she is left perfectly ignorant about the true
measure in the present as well as in the future. This situation is often called “ε-contamination
of conﬁdence.”
The ε-contamination is a special case of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity in which
the decision-maker faces not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures.
Since it is analytically tractable, a number of authors have examined the ε-contamination or its
variants in search behavior (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2001), portfolio choice (Chen and Epstein,
2002), learning (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2002) and voting (Chu and Liu, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple set of behavioral axioms under which
the decision-maker’s preference is represented by the Choquet expected utility with the ε-
contamination of conﬁdence. It turns out that a natural extension of the Anscombe and
Aumann theory (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) leads to the ε-contamination representation of
preferences.
2. Preliminaries
Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, where S is the set of states of the world and Σ is an
algebra on it. Let Y be a mixture space. We call an element of Y a lottery. As a concrete
example, X may be taken as a set of prizes and Y may be taken as the set of simple probability
measures on (X,2X). Then, Y will be clearly a mixture space with the operation in a vector
space. Given y,y  ∈ Y and λ ∈ [0,1], we denote by λy +( 1− λ)y  the “compound” lottery.1 A
simple lottery act is a Y -valued Σ-measurable function on S whose range is a ﬁnite subset of
Y . We henceforth call it a lottery act, or more simply, an act. The set of simple lottery acts
is denoted by L0. A lottery act whose range is a singleton is referred to as a constant act and
the set of constant acts is denoted by Lc.
1Here, λy +(1−λ)y
  should be understood as the element of Y to which (y,y
 ,λ) is mapped by the operation
which makes Y a mixture space, and hence, it does not necessarily mean the outcome of the operation in a vector
space. Accidentally, it does when Y is the set of simple probability measures on (X,2
X).2
The decision-maker’s preference is given by a binary relation   on L0. The two binary
relations,   and ∼, are deﬁned from   by:  ⇔⊀ and ∼⇔[  and ⊀]. A binary relation  
is a preference order by deﬁnition if it is asymmetric and negatively transitive.2 We deﬁne a
binary relation over Y by restricting   on Lc and denote it by the same symbol  , that is,
(∀y,y  ∈ Y ) y   y  ⇔ (∃f,g ∈ Lc)( ∀s ∈ S) f(s)=y, g(s)=y  and f   g.
We say that two acts, f and g, are comonotonic if (∀s,t ∈ S)[f(s)   f(t) ⇒ g(t)   g(s)].
In the following discussion, the “worst-limit” constant act as well as the “best-limit” one
plays a crucial role. Given f ∈ L0, let Yminf be the subset of Y representing f’s worst-limit
costant act, deﬁned by
Yminf = {y ∈ Y |(∀s) y   f(s) and (∃s) y = f(s)}.
Since f is a simple act, Yminf is nonempty when   is a preference order. We henceforth denote
by yminf an arbitrary element of Yminf. Similarly, Ymaxf, representing f’s best-limit constant
act, is deﬁned by
Ymaxf = {y ∈ Y |(∀s) y   f(s) and (∃s) y = f(s)},
and its arbitrary element is denoted by ymaxf.
Given f,g ∈ L0 and λ ∈ [0,1], a “compound” lottery act λf +(1−λ)g ∈ L0 is deﬁned by
(∀s)( λf +( 1− λ)g)(s)=λf(s)+( 1− λ)g(s). By this operation, L0 turns out to be a mixture
space. For a notational ease, we sometimes use the following notation:
fλg ≡ λf +( 1− λ)g.
Finally, a special case of the above “compound” lottery act will turn to be important. Deﬁne
(yminf)λ (ymaxf) ≡ λyminf +( 1− λ)ymaxf ,
that is, a “compound” act of the worst-limit act with “probability” λ and the best-limit act
with “probability” 1 − λ. We hereafter call it the λ-worst-limit 1 − λ-best-limit compound act.
2A binary relation   is asymmetric if (∀f,g ∈ L0) f   g ⇒ g
￿ f, and it is negatively transitive if (∀f,g,h ∈
L0)[ f
￿ g and g
￿ h] ⇒ f
￿ h.3
3. Axioms and Main Results
We consider the following set of axioms which may be imposed on a binary relation
deﬁned on L0. In the axioms, f, g and h denote arbitrary elements in L0 and λ denotes an
arbitrary real number such that λ ∈ (0,1]. The ﬁrst ﬁve axioms (A1 through A5) are the same
as those of Schmeidler (1989). The sixth and the seventh are new in the literature.
A1 (Ordering)   is a preference order on L0 .
A2 (Comonotonic-independence) If f,g,h are pairwise comonotonic, then
f   g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h   λg +( 1− λ)h.
A3 (Continuity) If f   g and g   h, then
(∃α,β ∈ (0,1)) αf +( 1− α)h   g and g   βf +( 1− β)h.
A4 (Monotonicity) [(∀s ∈ S) f(s)   g(s)] ⇒ f   g .
A5 (Non-degeneracy) (∃f,g ∈ L0) f   g .
As shown in Schmeidler (1989), these ﬁve axioms as a whole characterize the preference
which is represented by the Choquet expected utility with respect to some capacity.3
The next axiom requires that any simple lottery f is dominated by some compound
lottery of its worst-limit and best-limit constant acts. In the axiom, ε is a real number such
that ε ∈ [0,1). The axiom requires that the given relation should hold with respect to this ε.
Therefore, whether the axiom is satisﬁed or not depends on ε, and hence, it is labeled A6(ε),
rather than A6.
A6(ε) (Dominance of the ε-worst-limit 1 − ε-best-limit compound act)
(yminf)ε (ymaxf)[=(1− ε)ymaxf + εyminf]   f.
3For related axiomatizations, see Gilboa (1987) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).4
Under A1 through A6(ε), it can be shown (see Lemma 5 of Section 4) that all f ∈ L0
has the following ε-contamination equivalence:
(∀f ∈ L0)(∃yf ∈ Lc) f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf , (1)
where ε is the one with which A6(ε) holds. This property shows that all simple lottery acts have
their own equivalent compound act consisting of its worst-limit constant act with “probability”
ε and some constant act yf with “probability” 1 − ε.
Clearly, yf deﬁned in (1) is one way of representing f. We hereafter call it f’s equivalent
constant act in ε-contamination equivalence.
The next axiom concerns ordering among these equivalent constant acts in ε-contamination
equivalence. In the axiom, ε is a real number such that ε ∈ [0,1). By the same reason given for
A6(ε), we label it A7(ε), rather than A7.
A7(ε) (Irrelevance of the worst limit in ordering among equivalent constant acts in ε-contamination
equivalence) Both of the following hold:
A7(ε)-1 (Aﬃne irrelevance) If there exist yf,y g,y fλg ∈ Lc such that f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf,
g ∼ (1 − ε)yg + εyming and fλg ∼ (1 − ε)yfλg + εyminfλg, then yfλg ∼ λyf +( 1− λ)yg ; and
A7(ε)-2 (Monotone irrelevance) If (∀s) f(s)   g(s) and there exist yf,y g ∈ Lc such that
f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf and g ∼ (1 − ε)yg + εyming, then yf   yg.




are the equivalent acts of f,





λyf +(1−λ)yg, regardless of characteristics of the worst-limits yminf, yming and yminfλg. Sim-
ilarly, Axiom A7(ε)-2 implies that if f(s)   g(s) for all s, then the equivalent act of f and that
of g in ε-contamination equivalence, that is, yf and yg, should satisfy yf   yg, regardless of
characteristics of the worst-limits yminf and yming. These two axioms imply that the worst
limits are irrelevant in ordering among equivalent constant acts in ε-contamination equivalence.
Axioms A6(ε) and A7(ε) are closely related to the axioms of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963), especially their independence axiom. In fact they can be considered as a natural5
extension of the Anscombe-Aumann theory to the case in which the decision-maker has a fear
of the worst outcome with the possibility of ε all the time. We will turn to this issue in the
next section.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem and corollary. The proof is
relegated to Section 5.
Theorem 1. A binary relation   deﬁned on L0 satisﬁes A1-A5, A6(ε) and A7(ε) if and only
if there exist a unique ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ on (S,Σ), an aﬃne function u :
Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation, and ε ∈ [0,1) such that











Let M = M(S,Σ) be the set of ﬁnitely additive probability measures (probability charges)
on (S,Σ), let ε ∈ [0,1), and let µ ∈ M. Let us now deﬁne ε-contamination of µ, {µ}
ε , which
is a subset of M,b y
{µ}
ε = { (1 − ε)µ + εq| q ∈ M} .




















Therefore, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. A binary relation   deﬁned on L0 satisﬁes A1-A5, A6(ε) and A7(ε) if and only
if there exist a unique ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ on (S,Σ), an aﬃne function u :
Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation, and ε ∈ [0,1) such that









4. Relation to the Anscombe-Aumann Theory
Consider the following axiom which strengthens Axiom A2.
AA2 (Independence) f   g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h   λg +( 1− λ)h .
Note that in AA2, f, g and h are not assumed to be pairwise comonotonic. The next
theorem is well-known.
Theorem 2 (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). A binary relation   deﬁned on L0 satisﬁes
A1, AA2, A3, A4 and A5 if and only if there exist a unique ﬁnitely additive probability mea-
sure µ on (S,Σ) and an aﬃne function u : Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne
transformation, such that







We now show that Axioms A1-A5 and the following A6(0) and A7(0), which are special
cases of A6(ε) and A7(ε) by setting ε = 0, are necessary and suﬃcient for the Anscombe-Aumann
axioms (A1, AA2, A3-A5).
A6(0) ymaxf   f;
A7(0)-1 If there exist yf,y g,y fλg ∈ Lc such that f ∼ yf, g ∼ yg and fλg ∼ yfλg, then
yfλg ∼ λyf +( 1− λ)yg ; and
A7(0)-2 If (∀s) f(s)   g(s) and there exist yf,y g ∈ Lc such that f ∼ yf and g ∼ yg, then
yf   yg.
Proposition 1. (A1, AA2, A3, A4, A5) ⇒ (A6(0), A7(0)).
Proof. Assume that A1, AA2, A3, A4 and A5 are satisﬁed. It is immediate that A4 implies
A6(0) and that A1 and A4 imply A7(0)-2. Then, we only need to prove that A7(0)-1 holds.
The proof will be complete if we show the following claim:
(∀f,g,h ∈ L0) f ∼ g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h ∼ λg +( 1− λ)h, (3)7
for it follows from (3) that
λyf +( 1− λ)yg ∼ λyf +( 1− λ)g ∼ λf +( 1− λ)g = fλg ∼ yfλg .
However, A1, AA2 and A3 imply (3) by Kreps (1988, p.46, Lemma 5.6(c)). 
We also have its “converse.”
Proposition 2. (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6(0), A7(0)) ⇒ AA2.
Proof. Assume that A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6(0) and A7(0) are satisﬁed. Then, Lemma
5 (Section 5) proves that (∀f ∈ L0)(∃yf ∈ Lc) f ∼ yf (simply let ε = 0 there). Let
yf,y g,y h,y fλh,y gλh ∈ Lc be such that f ∼ yf, g ∼ yg, h ∼ yh, fλh ∼ yfλh and gλh ∼ ygλh,
and let f   g. Then, A1 implies that yf   yg. Since any pair of constant acts is comono-
tonic, A2 implies that λyf +( 1− λ)yh   λyg +( 1− λ)yh. Finally, A1 and A7(0)-1 imply that
fλh ∼ yfλh   ygλh ∼ gλh, which completes the proof. 
By combining these two propositions, we have
Proposition 3. (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6(0), A7(0)) ⇔ (A1, AA2, A3, A4, A5).
By this proposition, we immediately have that the set of axioms, (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5,
A6(0), A7(0)), characterizes the preference which is represented by (2). This shows that (A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, A6(ε), A7(ε)) can be considered as an extension of the Anscombe-Aumann
theory to the case where the decision-maker considers the possibility of the worst outcome with
the possibility of ε all the time (ε-contamination).
The similarity of our axioms with those of Anscombe and Aumann is utilized in the
proof of the main theorem, which we now turn to.8
5. Proof
The necessity of the axioms in Theorem 1 can be easily veriﬁed. We prove the suﬃciency
of them in this section.
Let ε ∈ [0,1) be such that Axioms A6(ε) and A7(ε) hold with it. We henceforth suppress
“(ε)” and simply write as A6 and A7. Throughout the section, we always assume that Axioms
A1-A5 are satisﬁed.
5.1. Deﬁnition of  ∗ and Preliminary Lemmas
We deﬁne a binary relation  ∗ on L0 induced by   as follows:
f  ∗ g ⇔

f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf and g ∼ (1 − ε)yg + εyming
⇒ yf   yg

,
where yf and yg are arbitrary elements of Lc. By deﬁnition, f  ∗ g holds true whenever there
does not exist such a yf and/or yg.
Clearly, yf [yg] is, if it exists (existence will be proved later in Lemma 5), f [g]’s equivalent
constant act in ε-contamination equivalence. Thus, the binary relation  ∗ is induced by the
original preferences over these equivalent constant acts. In this subsection, we show this induced
binary relation is a preference order by showing it is asymmetric (Lemma 6) and negatively
transitive (Lemma 3). We also prove non-degeneracy of the binary relation  ∗ (Lemma 4).
A binary relation on Y is naturally induced from  ∗ as its restriction on Lc and it is
denoted by the same symbol,  ∗. Also, we deﬁne  ∗ and ∼∗ from  ∗ by the same manner as
we did for  . Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1. Let f ∈ L0 and yf ∈ Lc.I ff ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf, then f ∼∗ yf.
Proof. Suppose that f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf. It always holds that yf ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminyf
since yminyf = yf. Furthermore, yf   yf since   is asymmetric. Therefore, by the deﬁnition of
 ∗, it follows that f  ∗ yf. Similarly, yf  ∗ f. Therefore, f ∼∗ yf. 
Lemma 2. The two binary relations,   and  ∗, coincide on Lc.9
Proof. Let y,y  ∈ Y . First, assume that y  ∗ y . Note that y ∼ (1 − ε)y + εyminy and
y  ∼ (1 − ε)y  + εy 
miny  hold since (∀y ∈ Y ) yminy = y. Hence, it follows from the deﬁnition of
 ∗ that y   y .
Second, assume that y   y . Let ¯ y and ¯ y  be arbitrary constant acts such that (a)
y ∼ (1−ε)¯ y+εyminy and (b) y  ∼ (1−ε)¯ y +εy 
miny . Such ¯ y and ¯ y  certainly exist (for example,
set ¯ y = y and ¯ y  = y ). From (a), it holds that (1−ε)y +εyminy ∼ (1−ε)¯ y +εyminy. Therefore,
A2 implies that y ∼ ¯ y (recall that any pair of constant acts is comonotonic). Similarly, it holds
from (b) that y  ∼ ¯ y . Finally, A1 and the assumption that y   y  show that ¯ y   ¯ y , which in
turn shows that y  ∗ y  by the deﬁnition of  ∗. 
Lemma 3. The binary relation  ∗ is negatively transitive.
Proof. Assume that f  ∗ g and g  ∗ h. Then, there exist constant acts yf and yg such that
f ∼ (1−ε)yf +εyminf, g ∼ (1−ε)yg +εyming and yf   yg, and there exist constant acts y 
g and
yh such that g ∼ (1 − ε)y 
g + εy 
ming, h ∼ (1 − ε)yh + εyminh and y 
g   yh. It then holds that
(1 − ε)yg + εyming ∼ g ∼ (1 − ε)y 
g + εy 
ming ∼ (1 − ε)y 
g + εyming
where the last indiﬀerence relation holds since yming ∼ y 
ming. (See Kreps, 1988, p.46, Lemma
5.6(c). Note that   satisﬁes all the axioms of the mixture-space theorem (Herstein and Milnor,
1954) on Lc and hence (3) holds on Lc.) Therefore, A2 implies that yg ∼ y 
g (recall that any pair
of constant acts are comonotonic). Hence, A1 implies that yf   yh, which shows that f  ∗ h.

Lemma 4. (∃f,g ∈ L0) f  ∗ g .
Proof. From A4 and A5, it follows that (∃y,y  ∈ Y ) y   y . Since  ∗ and   coincide on Lc
(Lemma 2), y  ∗ y . 
So far, we have not assumed any additional axioms beyond A1-A5. The following lemmas
need Axiom A6.10
Lemma 5. Assume that Axiom A6 holds. Then,
(∀f ∈ L0)(∃yf ∈ Lc) f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf .
Proof. Let f ∈ L0. Then,
y∗ ≡ (1 − ε)ymaxf + εyminf   f   yminf ≡ y∗ ,
where the ﬁrst and second orderings hold true by A6 and by A4, respectively. In the rest of
proof, we assume that
y∗   f   y∗ (4)
since the lemma would follow immediately otherwise.
This paragraph shows that
0 ≤ a<b≤ 1 ⇒ by∗ +( 1− b)y∗   ay∗ +( 1− a)y∗ . (5)
Let y ≡ by∗ +( 1− b)y∗. Then, it follows from A2 that y   y∗ (recall that any pair of constant
acts is comonotonic), and hence, that
y =( 1− (a/b))y +( a/b)y   (1 − (a/b))y∗ +( a/b)y
=( 1− (a/b))y∗ +( a/b)(by∗ +( 1− b)y∗)=ay∗ +( 1− a)y∗ ,
which shows the claim.
Deﬁne a∗ ∈ [0,1] by
a∗ = sup{a ∈ [0,1]|f   ay∗ +( 1− a)y∗ }.
The set deﬁning a∗ is nonempty by (4) and hence a∗ is well-deﬁned. We complete the proof in
three steps.
(a) Assume that a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗   f. Then, since a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗   f   y∗ by (4),
A3 implies that (∃b ∈ (0,1)) b(a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗)+( 1− b)y∗ = ba∗y∗ +( 1− ba∗)y∗   f. Since
a∗  = 0 by the assumption of (a), it holds that ba∗ <a ∗. It then follows from the deﬁnition of
a∗ that (∃a  ∈ (ba∗,a ∗)) f   a y∗ +( 1− a )y∗. Then, (5) implies that f   ba∗y∗ +( 1− ba∗)y∗,
which is a contradiction.11
(b) Assume that f   a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗. Then, since y∗   f   a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗ by (4),
A3 implies that (∃b ∈ (0,1)) f   (1−b)y∗+b(a∗y∗+(1−a∗)y∗)=( 1−b(1−a∗))y∗+b(1−a∗)y∗.
Since (1 − b(1 − a∗)) >a ∗, the deﬁnition of a∗ implies that (1 − b(1 − a∗))y∗ + b(1 − a∗)y∗   f,
which is a contradiction.
(c) By (a) and (b), only remaining possibility is: f ∼ a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗. On the other
hand,
a∗y∗ +( 1− a∗)y∗ = a∗((1 − ε)ymaxf + εyminf)+( 1− a∗)((1 − ε)yminf + εyminf)
=( 1− ε)(a∗ymaxf +( 1− a∗)yminf)+εyminf .
Therefore, to deﬁne yf = a∗ymaxf +( 1− a∗)yminf completes the proof. 
Lemma 6. Assume that Axiom A6 holds. Then, the binary relation  ∗ is asymmetric.
Proof. Assume that f  ∗ g. Also suppose that f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf and that g ∼ (1 −
ε)yg + εyming. The existence of constant acts, yf and yg, is guaranteed by Lemma 5. Then, it
follows from the deﬁnition of  ∗ that yf   yg and the asymmetry of   implies that yg   yf.
Hence, the deﬁnition of  ∗ implies that g  ∗ f. 
5.2.  ∗ and Anscombe-Aumman Axioms
In this subsection, we show that the binary relation  ∗ satisﬁes axioms postulated in
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). For concreteness, we ﬁrst list the Anscombe-Aumann axioms
below. In these axioms, f, g and h denote arbitrary elements in L0 and λ denotes an arbitrary
number such that λ ∈ (0,1].
AA1∗ (Ordering)  ∗ is a preference order on L0 .
AA2∗ (Independence) f  ∗ g ⇒ λf +( 1− λ)h  ∗ λg +( 1− λ)h .
AA3∗ (Continuity) If f  ∗ g and g  ∗ h, then
(∃α,β ∈ (0,1)) αf +( 1− α)h  ∗ g and g  ∗ βf +( 1− β)h.12
AA4∗ (Monotonicity) [(∀s ∈ S) f(s)  ∗ g(s)] ⇒ f  ∗ g .
AA5∗ (Non-degeneracy) (∃f,g ∈ L0) f  ∗ g .
It should be noted that we have already proved that  ∗ satisﬁes Axioms AA1∗ and AA5∗
when   satisﬁes Axiom A6 (Lemmas 3, 4 and 6). The following lemmas show that the other
axioms are also satisﬁed with Axioms A7-1 and A7-2 as well as Axiom A6.
Lemma 7. Assume that Axioms A6 and A7-1 hold. Then,  ∗ satisﬁes Axioms AA2∗ and
AA3∗.
Proof. (AA2∗) Assume that f  ∗ g and let yfλh and ygλh be any constant acts such that
λf +(1−λ)h ∼ (1−ε)yfλh+εyminfλh and λg+(1−λ)h ∼ (1−ε)ygλh+εymingλh. Such yfλh and
ygλh exist by Lemma 5. We show that yfλh   ygλh, which completes the proof by the deﬁnition
of  ∗.
By the assumption that f  ∗ g and Lemma 5, there exist constant acts yf, yg and yh
such that f ∼ (1−ε)yf +εyminf, g ∼ (1−ε)yg+εyming, h ∼ (1−ε)yh+εyminh and yf   yg. Since
any pair of constant acts is comonotonic, A2 implies that λyf +(1−λ)yh   λyg +(1−λ)yh.O n
the other hand, A7-1 implies that λyf +(1−λ)yh ∼ yfλh and λyg +(1−λ)yh ∼ ygλh. Therefore,
A1 shows that yfλh   ygλh.
(AA3∗) Assume that f  ∗ g and g  ∗ h and let yf, yg and yh be any constant acts such
that f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf, g ∼ (1 − ε)yg + εyming and h ∼ (1 − ε)yh + εyminh. Such yf, yg
and yh exist by Lemma 5. By the assumption that f  ∗ g and g  ∗ h and the deﬁnition of  ∗,
it follows that yf   yg and yg   yh. Then, A3 implies that there exists α ∈ (0,1) such that
αyf+(1−α)yh   yg. Let yfαh be any constant act such that αf+(1−α)h ∼ (1−ε)yfαh+εyminfαh.
Such a yfαh exists by Lemma 5. Then, A7-1 implies that yfαh ∼ αyf +(1−α)yh. Therefore, A1
shows that yfαh   yg, which in turn shows that αf +( 1− α)h  ∗ g by the deﬁnition of  ∗.A
similar proof applies for the existence of β. 
Lemma 8. Assume that Axioms A6 and A7-2 hold. Then,  ∗ satisﬁes Axioms AA4∗.13
Proof. Suppose that (∀s ∈ S) f(s)  ∗ g(s). Since  ∗ and   coincide on Lc (Lemma 2), it
follows that (∀s ∈ S) f(s)   g(s). Let yf and yg be constant acts such that f ∼ (1−ε)yf+εyminf
and g ∼ (1−ε)yg +εyming. Such yf and yg exist by Lemma 5. Then, A7-2 implies that yf   yg,
or equivalently, yg   yf. Therefore, it follows from the deﬁnition of  ∗ that g  ∗ f, implying
that f  ∗ g. 
5.3. Completion of Proof
Assume that all the axioms in the theorem hold. By Lemmas 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, the binary
relation  ∗ satisﬁes AA1∗-AA5∗. Therefore, Anscombe and Aumann’s theorem (1963) shows
that there exist a unique ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ on (S,Σ) and an aﬃne function
u : Y → R, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation, such that







Deﬁne J∗ : L0 → R by




Note that when f is a constant act such that (∃y ∈ Y )(∀s ∈ S) f(s)=y, then J∗(f)=u(y).
Deﬁne J : L0 → R by
(∀f ∈ L0) J(f)=u((1 − ε)yf + εyminf)
where yf ∈ Lc is a constant act such that
f ∼ (1 − ε)yf + εyminf . (8)
The existence of such a yf is guaranteed by Lemma 5. Note that u represents  ∗ on Lc by (6)
and that  ∗ and   coincide on Lc by Lemma 2. It then follows that u represents   on Lc. This
shows that J is well-deﬁned and represents   on L0.
Finally, we have














where the ﬁrst equality holds by the deﬁnition of J; the second equality holds by u’s aﬃnity;
the third equality holds by the deﬁnition of J∗ and the fact that u represents   on Y ; the fourth
equality holds by (8), Lemma 1 and the fact that J∗ represents  ∗; and the last equality holds
by (7). Since J represents   on L0, the proof is complete. 15
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